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SOURCE FBIB (This strictly factual report is based solely on monitored foreign radio broadcasts received in Washington up to 7 a.m., 28 September 1949. It reproduces a report prepared in response to a special request.)

INTRODUCTION: Moscow, via TASS, has finally begun to report selected items* from foreign press reactions to the President's announcement and the TASS communique. In general, the publicized items reflect belief in the validity of reports about Soviet atomic accomplishments, ** emphasize the necessity of banning the bomb as proposed by Vishinsky, and allegedly demonstrate that the U.S. has no intention of abandoning its cold-war policy. Moscow, however, has not yet exploited the recent spate of Satellite press and radio opinions which emphasize: (1) the crushing blow to "atomic diplomacy and blackmail"; (2) the reaffirmed Soviet peace policy and a predicted peace-movement "upsurge"; and (3) the need for implementation of the rejected Soviet proposals to ban the bomb. There has been little change in the pattern of comment from radios outside the Soviet orbit.

RADIO MOSCOW: To date, Moscow's only monitored comment* appears as a brief introduction to a TASS report of selected American press reactions. The comment, allegedly confirmed by the quoted items, holds that American business circles are cynically opposed to an increasingly demanded Soviet-American settlement of outstanding problems--"as this would lead to a reduction of armaments and would thus undermine the artificial support for American economy." In addition to relaying the above-mentioned types of foreign press items, TASS also reports the following interesting pieces: a Paris FRANCE-SOIR article about Soviet possession of aircraft for trans-

* Not aired, however, in voice broadcasts.

** Including the Soviet explosion of an actual bomb and possession of it or the secret of its production since 1947.

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For instance, Marinin says:

"The second Soviet proposal calls upon the General Assembly to declare the use of the atomic weapon and other means of mass destruction to be in direct contradiction to the conscience and honor of nations, and incompatible with membership in the U.N. organization. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has long been in possession of the atomic weapon, but ever since 1946 it has been consistently striving to have the atomic weapon banned and to establish strict international control to enforce this ban."

(in English to the United Kingdom, 3 October)

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porting the bomb; the Delhi NATION's contention that the U.S. has now been deprived of its military advantage, on which domination of the dollar in the capitalist world has been founded; and the Bombay CHRONICLE's opinion that a turn has come in the destiny of such countries as Iran and Turkey, which "hitherto lived under the umbrella of the American atom bomb."

SATELLITE RADIOS: Jubilance, self-confidence, and self-righteousness together with continued animus toward the atomic-blackmailing imperialist warmongers characterize the tone and content of Satellite comment, which is patterned on the following themes (presented in approximate order of emphasis):

1. Soviet Peacefulness: Soviet desire and efforts for peace constitute an ever-present claim. Soviet use of atomic energy for peacetime construction work is contrasted with American emphasis on the bomb itself. American use of the bomb for "blackmail" is compared with the complete absence of the same in Soviet policy--despite the USSR's possession of the bomb since 1947. The repeated Soviet proposals to ban the bomb are cited.

2. Ban the Bomb: This is a near-constant theme. The Soviet proposals "will now become the fighting program of the partisans of peace throughout the world," says one commentator. It is the task of the millions-strong peace forces "to compel the imperialists to accept the Soviet proposals," says another. Responsibility for an atomic armaments race and possible war is laid directly on the American doorstep. If American protestations of peace are sincere, this can be proved by American acceptance of the Soviet proposals. If Soviet possession of the bomb is "distasteful to Truman and his lackeys" they have the "very simple remedy" of accepting the Soviet proposals. It is suggested that the U.S. may now be more amenable, but doubts are also expressed.

3. A Crushing Blow to U.S. "Atomic Diplomacy and Blackmail": The American Government is likened to a man threatening with a revolver a peaceful and presumably defenseless person, and then finding that he too has a revolver. The American policy of "atomic blackmail," detailed at length, is said to have been foiled.

4. Explusion of the U.S.-Supremacy Myth and Illusion: Much is made of the U.S. loss of its atomic-bomb monopoly. The occasional explicit references to Soviet military strength, however, are not elaborated. But one comment contends that Americans can no longer be led by the belief that they are not threatened by the atomic bomb if U.S. rulers plunge the world into war. And another refers to the bomb as the first weapon making the U.S. vulnerable.

5. Truman's Evil Motives for His Announcement: There is less agreement about Truman's purposes in making the announcement at this particular time. All agree, however, that he intended no good. The most frequent charge is that he wanted to kindle a war hysteria in order to support the plans of the imperialists and warmongers.

6. Reactions: The imperialists are alarmed, panicky, and abjectly fearful. The "people" are jubilant. The USSR is calm. West-European statesmen are awakening from a hypnotic sleep into a world of reality.

7. Changed U.S. Tune: There are occasional claims that the U.S. is now talking about peace and opposition to the use of the bomb, whereas formerly just the opposite was the case.

As can be seen from the above, the Satellite radios have generally woven comments about the Soviet explosion into familiar elements of the standard Soviet propaganda pattern. Probably

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the most noteworthy deviation is the charge, by a Hungarian commentary attacking past instances of America's atom-bomb policy, that the U.S. dropped the bomb on a defenseless Japan whose cities were used as guinea pigs for American atomic-bomb experimentation.

RADIOS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET ORBIT: There has been little change in the pattern of non-Soviet comment. A Turkish commentary expects that the "real influence will be in motivating America with a little more vigor." And a Swiss commentator refers to the public opinion implications of the reduction in America's great military superiority and to the probable revival of Soviet-Communist prestige.

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